Beaten, "Israel," Iran's nuclear program: prospects and implications (*) z
by: dr. Talal Atrissi
For the first time in the history of the Israeli army is the official announcement that Iran is a strategic enemy number one, and that the Iranian nuclear weapons constitutes an existential threat, and that the problem of the elimination of the Iranian nuclear threat is one of the most serious security issues facing the political leadership and the Israeli military since the establishment of the Jewish state.The announcement came at the annual conference of the Israeli military command, which includes senior officers of the 18/2/2009. z
First: the Israeli position
Have three levels of the Israeli position towards how to deal with the Iranian nuclear program as follows: z
Level I: was expressed by politicians and military leaders (Barak, Ashkenazi, Olmert, Netanyahu, Lieberman ...) that the Jewish state to prepare for the military option, and to prepare for an attack at any moment on the occasion of Iran's nuclear facilities. With assurances of the Chief of Army Staff Gabi Ashkenazi said that the information available to the "Israel" is that Iran will be able by the end of the year 2009 to produce a nuclear bomb. This is the strategy that it calls Netanyahu: Iran first. Any face of the Iranian nuclear threat before any other issue, Palestinian or Syrian or Lebanese. Lieberman is a major problem in Iran, the Middle East. z
Level II: was expressed by the former intelligence chief, Major General Aharon Zeevi Farkash, the Reserve, who said that "Israel" would not be able to meet its own nuclear threat, and she is in dire need of help the United States. He added that in the event of a military strike against Iran, "the Israel" not to be involved more, calling on the Israeli side to "a little humility." Farkash, has been accompanied by a statement which stunned the frankness of many, with assurances from the other political and military, "warns of the danger of the enormous sense of arrogance, which is hampered by the realities of the lack of a convincing victory in the war: War of Attrition and the Yom Kippur War and the Lebanon wars of the first and second ...", and the danger of making decisions reckless in light of the leadership is incompetent. Also provided at the same time a group of former senior officials in the Israeli security service's recommendations to address multiple dimensions of the nuclear threat of Iran with sanctions, in which to influence public opinion with the preparations for the Iranian military and the prosecution of President Ahmadinejad, any recommendations that the Government is trying to keep Netanyahu from reckless military . z
Level III: can be seen in the position of head of state, Shimon Peres, who told the American envoy to the Middle East, George Mitchell, in 17/4/2009, the army has no intention of attacking Iran, and that it should be the creation of broad international cooperation on the Iranian issue, and that all talk of a possible Israeli attack on Iran is not correct, the solution is not military in Iran. z
The Israeli press also saw extensive comments on the "Iranian threat", and went some comments and editorials to the conclusion: "The Israeli attack can not be guaranteed to frustrate Iran's nuclear program ..." Do you know what and where Israel should be attacked ?..." (Ha'aretz), and "settling the Iranian nuclear power, we have a large" (Yoel Marcus) ... z
Parallel to these three directions, the Israeli army in the exercises and training, and the introduction of weapons, and the purchase of more aircraft and more sophisticated intelligence in the world, and testing of missile system "Arrow" interceptor, to the "satisfaction" Netanyahu, the Israeli preparations for a military option against Iran . z
This does not mean the three levels of attitudes and trends - which may overlap with each other - that there is a difference in describing the "Iranian threat" against the Jewish state, but the difference is the disparity on the priorities to deal with this threat; between those who want to postpone military action is looming by early, it is preferred or the payment of the participation of others such as the United States to launch a military attack to Iran. z
But there is fear of the "Israel", which it considers "the passage of time": that the U.S. negotiating position - if the Iranian long-standing Iran obtain a nuclear bomb. Since they can not prevent Obama from the Department of option negotiation and dialogue, the "Israel" may be called the Department to be a dialogue with Iran conditional on the roof of a specific timetable, so that after the truth or prove the true intentions of Iran to adhere to a peaceful nuclear program, or otherwise indicated , then the Israeli leaders would have justified the military action without any opposition from the U.S. or Europe. z
Second: the U.S. position
The American position seems crucial to the intentions and Israeli preparations to strike Iran, it is not only not to encourage any military option, but strongly opposed such an option at this stage, even if Iran is a threat on the Jewish state. But does not vary with the American administration on the Israeli vision of the priorities of the solution in the Middle East, instead of the "Iran first" priority of this administration's view of progress on the Palestinian track, the consent to the two-state solution; because of this Declaration, in accordance with the American perspective, it could help in the formation of Israeli, Arab-American front to isolate Iran. While Netanyahu and Lieberman to address the Iranian nuclear file is the first of which would allow progress in the Palestinian file; the fact that Iran could disrupt any progress is happening at this level, must therefore limit the ability of Iran - and to stop its nuclear program - before moving on to the Palestinian file. z
And go beyond the U.S. administration, the Israeli officials have warned the clear "from the Washington surprise military operation against Iran," warning him a head of the CIA was Leon Panetta (25/5/2009). Why? Because such a move as the Chief of Staff U.S. Joint Forces, Michael Mullen, "that would offer the entire region at risk" (28/3/2009), while U.S. Vice President Joe Biden to attack, "Israel" for Iran would be a kind of "reckless "(9/4/2009). The Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, said he was "surprised that Israel took the initiative to launch a military operation against Iran," and warned at the same time, a similar process, "because that would not only lead to the postponement of the nuclear program, Iran's determination to increase, and that the strike would have serious consequences , and whip up hatred against the charge "imposed on it (17/4/2009). z
So, the American Administration does not support the status quo in the Israeli military strike against Iran, and the American administration wants the new Israeli government's declaration of support "two-state solution", and retreat from the building of settlements, which would allow for the moderate Arab countries, claim to achieve real progress on the Palestinian track. z
II: Possible scenarios
What are the options available in the view of the facts prior to the "Israel" to deal with the so-called "Iran's existential threat"? What is the reflection of the assumed scenarios for the Middle East in general and especially on the Palestinian cause? z
The first scenario: the resort to a military strike - a brief few hours - to destroy Iran's nuclear facilities, Vttih American Dialogue Project - Iranian expected. The government fears the Israeli administration of the directions suggested by the American air cover for the protection of nuclear, "Israel", which implies the recognition of Iran's nuclear capabilities. In the view of "Israel" in the policies of Obama, a new phase is very different from the stage of unlimited support and unconditional witnessing with the Bush administration (the lack of conformity of views between Obama and Netanyahu, after the latter's visit to the White House on 18/5/2009).The Israeli government believes that Obama is not any interest in military action against Iran with the need to dialogue with them to fix the conditions in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and the economic crisis, suppressed the capacity of all the great powers, each one of these forces requires an urgent need to defer to the international and avoided confrontations (Kissinger 29/4/2009).Thus, the military option as a "preemptive strike" by the volatility of things upside down and forced management to Obama to stand by "Israel" and not only to retreat from the idea of dialogue with Iran, and stop exerting pressure on the Israeli Government to accept the two-state solution. As well as the decline of Western approaches to dialogue with Hamas. z
In such a scenario, there will be "Israel" was forced to continue to negotiate with Syria, with the announcement of Netanyahu's refusal to withdraw from the Golan, and probably the Israeli leadership will seize the opportunity of war to strike hard at Hamas leaders and leaders of the resistance in Palestine; because the whole world to contain such a long Sinchgl the strike. And will stop the negotiations until the Palestinian Authority, that would be "Iran first" and not the Palestinian issue is the major problem that must be resolved to the world. This scenario faces one of two options: z
The first is to succeed, "Israel" in the destruction of some of Iran's nuclear facilities of Iran are unable to respond in a timely manner, any verification, "Israel" lightning victory. In such a case, of course, not the Israeli government made any concessions on the two countries are not in settlements in the Arab peace initiative, and will pressure the Arab and Israeli and international movements of resistance - mainly Hamas - to force it to accept all were rejected in the past, recognition of Israel to the international resolutions signed to power with "Israel" from the conventions. z
The second possibility to respond to Iran strongly the Israeli aggression, even if the latter succeeded in the destruction of some nuclear facilities, which would ignite the entire region and put it to the wide range of possibilities over the flames. In other words, the new balance of forces will be established after the war to push the Israeli government if it loses the confrontation to retreat and the recognition of the two-state solution. It will be the resistance movements in Palestine and Lebanon are the first beneficiaries of the new situation, but this may increase the possibility of Arab fears of Iran, and force the United States to stand strongly once again to the "Israel" does not even have to make any additional concessions. z
Scenario II: the waiting, "Israel" - despite it - the results of the American dialogue with Iran, not to take any military action, anger management, and Obama's large accounts with regional Arab allies, who want to - after long years of negotiation - to achieve any breakthrough on the Palestinian track ( such as the approval of the two-state solution). "In such a case it would not deliberate the Netanyahu administration to make any real concessions, not the Palestinians nor the Syrian party, even if negotiations resumed; that the strategy of "Israel" in this case would be the strategy of "wait and delay." It is likely that, at this period: the assassinations, the rejection of Hamas's participation in any government, and refused to negotiate with the Hamas government, more cooperation - and normalization - with "moderate", and incitement to intimidation from Iran and its nuclear program, while continuing to prepare for strike military action against Iran. Netanyahu will not stop the Government from building more settlements, with a focus on the differences widen Palestinian - Palestinian, which seems it will continue with the formation of a new government had not received the national consensus of all factions. But "Israel" will not back down during the "wait" for the reiteration of the threat of Iran and the Arab world, and call for further sanctions against Tehran. z
IV: prospects and implications
Appears that the Government of Netanyahu - Lieberman would not dare risk the selection of the first scenario for the following reasons: z
1ـ packet U.S. President strict and clear in rejecting this option, which all disrupt the strategy in the Middle East. z
2ـ lack of unanimity on the internal Israeli scenario. z
3ـ fears of the Iranian reaction has been widespread in Iran is ready for serious military level for this type of response. z
This means that the Israeli government will be forced to retreat from the constant threat to strike Iran, especially since President Bush alluded to the period of time to make sure that Iran's desire for dialogue is the end of this year, which reflected its ability to deal with the situation in Pakistan and Afghanistan, that "Israel" wait until the period before contemplating any military action. Perhaps President Obama will try in this period, "extract" some concessions from Netanyahu, would satisfy Arab allies, and promote the development of the Palestinian Authority, Hamas and weaken the opposition and other forces; such as stopping the construction of settlements, or release of Palestinian prisoners, or the opening of the crossings and a return to dialogue with the Palestinian Authority, Even if Netanyahu did not announce its commitment to a Palestinian state, or the two-state solution. We will be in front of any additional months of standstill, without any real progress without any serious commitments by the Israeli side key, but the Israeli government will during this period is likely to widen the circle of normalization with Arab countries, on a cordon, "the Palestinian extremism" is allied with Iran, which hinder the the peace process.This calls attention to the lack of a slide to the Israelis and the Americans want the escalation of the Palestinian - Palestinian dispute, and the vigilance of the assassination of the leaders of the resistance, or limited military operations inside Gaza in particular, and lack of tolerance with the media and political attempts to form the Arab - Israeli confrontation under the title "The danger Iranian "in the region. z
(*) Estimate Zaytouna Center for Strategic Studies - 22-06-2009
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